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Objectives: Many existing healthcare interventions diffused before modern
evidence-based standards of clinical- and cost-effectiveness. Disinvestment from
ineffective or inappropriately applied practices is growing as a priority for international
health policy, both for improved quality of care and sustainability of resource allocation.
Australian policy stakeholders were canvassed to assess their perspectives on the
challenges and the nature of disinvestment.
Methods: Senior health policy stakeholders from Australia were criterion and snow-ball
sampled (to identify opinion leaders). Participants were primed with a potential
disinvestment case study and took part in individual semistructured interviews that
focused on mechanisms and challenges within health policy to support disinvestment.
Interviews were taped and transcribed for thematic analysis. Participant comments were
de-identified.
Results: Ten stakeholders were interviewed before saturation was reached. Three
primary themes were identified. (i) The current focus on assessment of new and emerging
health technologies/practices and lack of attention toward existing practices is due to
resource limitations and methodological complexity. Participants considered a parallel
model to that of Australia’s current assessment process for new medical technologies is
best-positioned to facilitate disinvestment. (ii) To advance the disinvestment agenda
requires an explicit focus on the potential for cost-savings coupled with improved quality of
care. (iii) Support (financial and collaborative) is needed for research advancement in the
methodological underpinnings associated with health technology assessment and for
disinvestment specifically.
Conclusions: In this exploratory study, stakeholders support the notion that systematic
policy approaches to disinvestment will improve equity, efficiency, quality, and safety of
health care, as well as sustainability of resource allocation.
Keywords: Disinvestment, Policy, Stakeholder engagement, Health technology
assessment, Obsolescence, Cost-effectiveness
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The term disinvestment in health care is gaining promi-
nence internationally. It relates to the processes of (partially
or completely) withdrawing health resources from existing
healthcare practices, procedures, technologies, or pharma-
ceuticals that are deemed to deliver little or no health gain
for their cost, and thus do not represent efficient health re-
source allocation. Arguably the goal of reducing use of less
effective (or inappropriately applied) technologies or prac-
tices has been central to evidence-based medicine for well
over a decade. In the early 1990s, claims were made that
in all areas of health care, “30–40% of patients do not re-
ceive treatments of proven effectiveness,” and, “20–25% of
patients have treatments that are unnecessary or potentially
harmful” (26;28). Since then, advances have been made in-
ternationally to improve primarily the safety of health care,
but also clinical- and cost-effectiveness (13;14;19).
Considerable effort and resources have been invested in
Australia in developing well-defined criteria and evidence-
based policy processes for assessing new and emerging health
technologies, surgical procedures, and pharmaceuticals to
gauge their safety, effectiveness- and cost-effectiveness
(17;20). Reimbursement approval (and, therefore, universal
access through Australia’s Medicare system) (13) for these
new services, as well as the withdrawal of reimbursement for
existing services rests with the Australian Government Min-
ister for Health and Ageing. Decisions of the Minister occur
under advice from the Medical Services Advisory Commit-
tee (MSAC) and, for pharmaceuticals, the Pharmaceutical
Benefits Advisory Committee (PBAC). The MSAC and the
PBAC are supported by health technology assessment (HTA)
groups, using stringent review processes based on the quality
of data and evidence available at the time of assessment. Un-
derpinning disinvestment, however, is recognition that these
stringent assessment methods are relatively novel and the
processes focus overwhelmingly on technologies or practices
with new applications for reimbursement/registration within
particular jurisdictions and not on existing services (even
though this is within the mandate of the MSAC). Australia,
therefore, like other countries, suffers from a legacy whereby
many currently implemented healthcare interventions dif-
fused before well-defined standards of cost-effectiveness be-
came a criterion for reimbursement and there are no system-
atic processes in place for disinvestment.
Internationally, the notion of disinvestment is gaining
prominence. Recently, for example, the United Kingdom’s
(UK) National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) an-
nounced a formal policy agenda to, “purge from the NHS
treatments that do not improve health or are poor value for
money” (10). It is interesting to note however that subsequent
to the NICE disinvestment agenda being released, a formal
UK Treasury report into UK health research and funding
reinforced the challenges faced in this area:
The delivery of robust scientific appraisal for technologies is coming
under increasing challenge as a result of its reliance on methodolo-
gies that, it is widely recognized, need further development, given
that Health Technology Assessment (HTA) is a relatively new sci-
ence. Appropriate research is required to address these challenges.
In particular, research into methodology for . . . disinvestment meth-
ods (3) (page 103)
In Australia and internationally, effective disinvestment, par-
ticularly of nonpharmaceuticals, appears limited. We specu-
late that this limitation in capacity is, at least in part, a result
of methodological, as well as political and professional com-
plexities associated with disinvesting existing practices. In
this manuscript, we present the perspectives of senior Aus-
tralian health policy stakeholders on the challenges associ-
ated with disinvestment, together with their suggestions for
advancing the disinvestment agenda.
METHODS
For this study, standard qualitative research methods in-
formed the design and analysis (4). A principle was set
whereby interviews would cease when saturation of re-
sponses was reached. Ten senior policy makers from Aus-
tralian Commonwealth and State health departments, ad-
ministrative bodies, and academic institutions were selected
as a primary pool of participants and invited to take part.
Purposive sampling of this core group was criterion-based,
with selection informed by their current and/or past posi-
tion(s)/role(s) in Australian health policy. Balance of repre-
sentation was sought across departments and state versus na-
tional policy roles to ensure that stakeholders from a range of
relevant jurisdictions and policy areas were included. Snow-
balling was then carried out whereby the original ten partici-
pants (who agreed to take part) were asked to nominate other
stakeholders whom they considered should be approached.
From the outset a second pool of participants was established
in the event saturation did not occur from pool one.
Stakeholders were approached by introductory e-mail,
which detailed this as a research initiative, stating that their
involvement would be anonymous and that results would be
published. Attached to the e-mail was a three-page prepara-
tory document containing a potential disinvestment case
study that examined the efficacy of upper airway surgical
procedures for the treatment of adult obstructive sleep ap-
nea syndrome (OSA). Opinion as to the role of these pro-
cedures is divided (21;23). Numerous reports recommend
their restricted use, including the original (2) and updated
(27) Cochrane reviews, the Scottish Intercollegiate Guide-
lines Network (25), and the report of a Joint Nordic Project
on OSA (24). Despite these recommendations, Australian
Medicare data indicates the procedures are widespread and
increasing (6). The prereading material consisted of a sum-
mary of the 2004 Cochrane review as well as two relevant
publications in the area by this research team (6;7). Also
included was a list of twenty-four relevant citations as pre-
sented in one of the publications by this group (6). This
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case study was used to establish a context for disinvestment
from which to explore potential policy implications relat-
ing to quality and appropriateness of care, and of allocative
efficiency of healthcare resources.
Stakeholders were invited to suggest a time for the in-
terview (in person or by means of telephone if resident in a
state other than South Australia) and receipt of a response
was construed as providing consent. Individual semistruc-
tured interviews were conducted wherein participants were
invited to discuss predetermined issues at length. Questions
were not predisclosed to stakeholders. Interviews were taped
(consent for this was provided by all participants) and sub-
sequently transcribed by an independent person for thematic
analysis by the lead author. Any audio that was unclear to
the transcriber or thematic analyzer was returned (as text)
to the participant for checking and clarification (respondent
validation).
In total, participants completed a fourteen-question in-
terview starting with three specific surgery for OSA-related
questions before moving on to broader macro-level health
policy issues (i.e., related to disinvestment more broadly).
The interview schedule is available from the lead author
upon request. In this manuscript, we report themes associ-
ated with the eleven disinvestment-related items; the specific
surgery/OSA component is to be reported elsewhere. Tran-
scripts underwent thematic analysis. Themes are presented
where consensus or collective weight of opinion was demon-
strated by majority of participants.
RESULTS
Sample Size and Respondent Description
Of the original ten stakeholders, one actively declined to par-
ticipate and one did not reply to e-mails. Eight agreed to
participate. These eight then nominated a further six partic-
ipants beyond those already involved. Of the additional six,
one actively declined and one did not reply. Four new policy
makers agreed to participate in the knowledge they had been
nominated, taking the pool of voluntary participants to twelve
(75% response/consent rate). Ten interviews were carried out
before it was decided that saturation of responses had been
reached (ie, consenting participants #11 and #12 were not
interviewed due to saturation being reached at participant
#10). Table 1 details participant characteristics.
POLICY-MAKERS’ PERSPECTIVES
Examples of Disinvestment in Australian
Health Care
Policy stakeholders could recall numerous Australian-based
examples where disinvestment (eg, restricted or eliminated
reimbursement) had occurred based solely on grounds of
safety (pharmaceuticals primarily). However, for disinvest-
ment due to demonstrated lack of effectiveness, recall of ex-















amples by participants was limited. Participants offered the
following items as having undergone partial disinvestment
(ie, restricted reimbursement): gastric freezing for ulcers; as-
sisted reproductive technologies by age of recipient; surgical
management of hernia; intra-operative esophageal echocar-
diography; hyperbaric oxygen therapy, and ear grommets.
When asked to list any items to have undergone full dis-
investment (ie, Medicare item number removed) on effec-
tiveness grounds, these were limited to: various lobotomy
procedures. Interestingly this example was noted to have
occurred decades ago. Participants could offer no contem-
porary examples of complete and effective disinvestment.
When asked to briefly identify any existing practices or tech-
nologies they believe represent potential items for prospec-
tive disinvestment analyses, the following were identified
(as examples): caesarean section (rates); some spinal sur-
gical procedures; spinal fusions for pain relief; pulmonary
artery catheterization; drug-eluting stents; surgery for OSA;
grommets; arthroscopy; particular models of hip replace-
ment technology; tonsillectomy. All participants suggested
that there are many more items “out there” that would fit into
this category. Again, it should be noted that questions were
not predisclosed to participants; therefore, these responses
were “off the cuff.” Importantly, participants noted that sub-
stantial complexity and constraint in this issue relates to a
general lack of evidence of effectiveness for existing prac-
tices and technologies, as distinct from clear evidence for lack
of effectiveness. This reportedly hinders the decision-making
processes for potential disinvestment. As summarized by one
participant:
The problem which MSAC comes up against all the time and I
imagine any health technology agency or even any evidence-based
assessment, like Cochrane, is that there may not be evidence at all,
or there may only be limited evidence and so you’re having to base
the decision on lack of evidence rather than evidence of lack of
effectiveness . . . are you going to stop something because there’s a
lack of evidence? Well you wouldn’t necessarily want to go down
that path for an old technology because it’s just that the studies
haven’t been done (Stakeholder #1).
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This perspective was widely held and indicates that substan-
tial challenges exist around adequate and timely definition,
and acceptable proof, of practice/technology inferiority (ob-
solescence). Proving inferiority is perceived as not only con-
ceptually difficult but also limited by data availability and
interpretation, that is, by the nature and availability of the
evidence. Stakeholder one went on to say:
You would accept different levels of evidence because [for some
practices] you’re never going to get higher levels . . . which is why
people say it’s [MSAC] inconsistent, but when you look at it, it’s
actually dealing with a different set of criteria almost. (Stakeholder
#1).
Issue 1: The Existence of Disinvestment
Policy Mechanisms in Australia
Policy stakeholders were asked a series of five semistruc-
tured questions relating to the existence in Australia of pol-
icy mechanisms or frameworks that might support an effec-
tive disinvestment strategy. Table 2 presents a synthesis of
themes (with select quotations) resulting from the analysis of
this topic. Participants overwhelmingly pointed to the current
MSAC/PBAC models as the most logical to support disin-
vestment in Australia, given their existing and well tested
role in facilitating the assessment of new and emerging prac-
tices, technologies (MSAC) and pharmaceuticals (PBAC).
However, it was also widely acknowledged that the MSAC
currently has limited capacity to perform this parallel role due
to resource constraints and that it is perpetually stretched with
an almost overwhelming stream of submissions for new and
emerging technologies, with no residual capacity to address
existing items. Other organizations such as the National Insti-
tute for Clinical Studies (NICS) and the Australian Commis-
sion for Safety and Quality in Health Care were also noted as
potentially playing a role in the disinvestment arena, though
it was claimed that “quality” is, at present, taking a back
seat to politically sensitive issues associated with “safety” in
health care (adverse events, and so on). Although the par-
ticipants considered this ordering of political sensitivities to
be understandable and reasonable, they noted that a focus
on “quality” is parallel to, but in many ways distinct from,
the complexities associated with safety and this needs to be
recognized in the planning of disinvestment policy models.
Participants also pointed to the complexities associated
with incentive and disincentive mechanisms and how disin-
vestment, to be effective, must negotiate, circumvent, and
overcome the political sensitivities associated with what
some may perceive as overt restrictions on clinical auton-
omy and patient choice. Throughout these discussions were
specific references to what participants perceived as overt,
practical barriers to disinvestment. One of these included
certain political complexities:
. . . if you wandered into a hospital and said ok, by Monday, ladies
and gentlemen, anything, except what you’ve got clinical evidence
for, you’ve got to stop doing. The place would explode. There are
people who’d have a nervous breakdown. They’d go to the Prime
Minister and say we’ve been denied access to our machinery for
treating people with subdural hemorrhage. He’d say well, in that
case it’s because the administrators say we haven’t got evidence it
works. So the fact that they may not have evidence would become
politically irrelevant. The first thing he [the PM] would do, would
be to call the administrators and say what on earth do you think
you’re doing? (Stakeholder #4).
To overcome this, according to participants, requires con-
tinued research both for evidence generation and for the ad-
vancement of disinvestment methodologies that allow for the
incorporation of multiple perspectives (researcher, clinical,
consumer, and policy) into policy decision processes (dis-
cussed further).
Issue 2: Future Policy Directions for
Disinvestment
Policy stakeholders were asked additional semistructured
questions relating to future policy directions for disinvest-
ment in Australia, including the role of research and interest
groups, and how disinvestment might gain greater promi-
nence in the policy arena. Table 3 presents a synthesis of
themes (with select quotations) resulting from the analysis
in this area. In building from issue 1 (discussed above) there
was general consensus that a parallel but separate commit-
tee based on the MSAC model would best serve a disin-
vestment agenda. Specifically, this might occur by means of
the establishment of a legal framework to identify practices/
technologies and support the health technology assessment
process with potential for subsequent controls on reimburse-
ment structures. Another of the noted barriers to disinvest-
ment is that it remains low on the political agenda, with a
perceived lack of priority. As one stakeholder offered:
Well, policy makers I think are very fine examples, actually, of
Newton’s regenerative second law of motion; they continue at rest or
at a state of uniform velocity until they’re turned. The question that
every policy maker asks when they start sipping their cappuccino
each morning is what would happen today if I do nothing. That’s
their fundamental question so if you come in with something and
say hello policy maker, I’m here from Evidence Base Inc. and I’ve
got some views for you they will look at it, peer over the froth
and then say, hmm, what will happen if I do nothing. So if you
really want to influence them you’ve gotta have something that says
‘hey policy maker, if you don’t do this the cappuccino machine
downstairs is going to explode’ or ‘the minister is going to have
your head on a platter because this does not look good for him
or her’ or ‘this is going to increase your waiting time by 20% in
this department and you know how the minister reacted to that last
time’. . .” (Stakeholder #4)
Not surprisingly, participants considered the best av-
enue to advance the disinvestment agenda within policy
4 INTL. J. OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT IN HEALTH CARE 24:1, 2008
Policy-makers’ perspectives on disinvestment
Table 2. Does Australia Have an Effective Disinvestment Policy Mechanism?
Theme: MSAC recognized as the
primary policy mechanism but with
limitations: Select quotes
Theme: Weakness at system level.
Under-resourced policy approach:
Select quotes
Theme: Complexity associated with
incentive and disincentive mechanisms
and political sensitivities: Select quotes
We have a reasonably sophisticated but
also a complicated system in
MSAC (S1)
I don’t think they’re [MSAC] actually
resourced and that’s part of the
problem . . . these committees are
loaded up with proposals and they just
don’t have the capacity . . . we do need
to look at ways of spreading the work
across more people (S3)
It’s just the politics around taking
something off the schedule . . . the
health minister would have to be fairly
brave or have very clear evidence that
it’s doing greater harm than good before
they’d be prepared to move. I think
there’s a significant unwillingness in
Commonwealth health . . . to understand
the role of evidence in forming policy
(S5)
No, I don’t think we do. We have a
process for restricting what goes onto
the schedule, that’s MSAC . . . it
doesn’t have capacity to do system
like reviews of stuff already on the
system (S3)
By and large, the focus has been on
adverse events, safety issues and that
has been a big enough challenge of the
last decade. The key question that
we’re talking about, they’re [MSAC]
absolutely inundated and
overwhelmed with new and emerging,
they have no capacity to look at this
(S9)
Reality is, and putting it really bluntly, I
don’t think there’s any incentive in the
system whatsoever for a surgeon, who’s
particularly in a lucrative practice, to do
this. Because they’re operating in a
business paradigm. They might be
operating in a care paradigm but the
business paradigm, I think, works much
harder than the care paradigm when it
looks to reducing costs (S2)
I think that there’s a better policy
mechanism in place in terms of the
introduction of new pharmaceuticals
but . . . existing practices are not
something that get a great deal of
scrutiny (S6)
There’s not many strengths and it is an
area that does need to be addressed. I
think there should be greater clarity,
transparency, more use of evidence
and therefore more fairness and there
should be some public input but I
would have reservations about the
community being the sole decision
maker (S8)
I don’t think they [clinicians] have any
incentive, do they . . . I’m not suggesting
they’re mean but why would you want
to challenge, unless the evidence
jumped up and hit you in the face (S3)
No, it’s ad hoc and it would vary, there
may very well be, in some hospitals,
possibly in [the state of] New South
Wales in some regions. I suppose
MSAC and PBAC are the only two
that are sort of there at the national
level (S8)
Either way, if they have a process, right,
how does it come to their attention is
the question. How do you start, what
triggers the start of the process? (S5)
[Guidelines] are good in theory but in
practice, unless there’s a political reason
for wanting to have that therapy
assessed it doesn’t get done (S4)
No I don’t believe so but the way the
Australian Commission for Safety and
Quality in Health Care is moving
towards accreditation and
standards . . . there is an increasing
interest in this area and so I believe it
will emerge (S9)
A culture of distrust that goes through a
whole lot of levels, like, the schedule
of course is a commonwealth
instrument, the states and territories
run the hospitals . . . the healthcare
agreement essentially was never really
about improving the quality or the
efficiency of healthcare (S10)
We’ve got long and good ministerial
guideline development with no
incentive structure that sits behind it to
make it work and therefore it doesn’t.
When I talk about the incentives I don’t
talk about the incentives for people to
challenge it, I actually talk about the
incentives that stops the practitioner
from using it (S7)
Note. Strengths and weaknesses: a synthesis of themes comprising responses to five semistructured questions. The semistructured method allowed
for expanded/detailed responses to the five questions relating to disinvestment policy mechanisms. The included select quotes are chosen as offering
representation of the theme/direction of consensus. No individual participant has more than one quote included in any one column within the table (participant
pseudonym(s) provided, eg, S1 = Stakeholder 1). The Medical Services Advisory Committee (MSAC) advises the Minister for Health and Ageing
on evidence for safety and (cost) -effectiveness of medical technologies and procedures. This advice informs decisions about public funding. The
Pharmaceuticals Benefits Advisory Committee (PBAC) assesses applications for listing of medicines on the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme.
circles may be the accentuation of cost savings and
sustainability aspects achievable with disinvestment, cou-
pled with improved quality of care. As one participant
offered:
. . .show that you can, within the existing envelope, offer at least
a no more expensive and arguably cheaper structure and tag with
it better quality . . . line the dollars up with the quality, then I think
they’ll be interested . . . (Stakeholder #10)
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Table 3. What is the best way forward to address disinvestment from a policy perspective, including how to bring it to the
attention of health policy makers?
Theme: A policy mechanism in parallel to
the existing MSAC structure suggested:
select quotes
Theme: Gaining policy attention requires
presenting a case for allocative efficiency/cost
savings and improved quality of care:
select quotes
Theme: There is a need for Health Services
Research (HSR) developments to progress
disinvestment mechanisms and assist
decision making processes: select quotes
You need a separate committee, one to
review new proposals and another to
systematically review what’s there. There
may be some mechanism for the two to
come together (S3)
I think what needs to be done is to show that
you can, within the existing envelope, offer
at least a no more expensive and arguably
cheaper structure and tag with it better
quality . . . line the dollars up with the
quality, then I think they’ll be
interested . . . of course, the other thing is
they don’t want a war (S10)
The problem for us is that we have a very
low funding tool for Health Services
Research (S1)
Establishing some frameworks both at the
national and state level that have got some
teeth in terms of, I hate to say it, carrot and
stick approaches but I say that with a little
bit of reservation. How does the
department from a policy perspective
tackle every single clinical problem
without it costing a fortune (S2)
The evidence is there but the politics are
around providing a win–win situation for
patients as well . . . I think the National
Institute of Clinical Studies (NICS) is
probably the body that should be doing
this, also, the MSAC (S5)
you have to develop a classification, a way of
deciding which items you’re going to attack,
and I’m not quite sure I’m 100% clear on
that but probably the ones associated with
either significant expense or high volume
would be the ones you tick off first (S9)
In terms of evaluation I believe most systems
are completely irresponsible around not
apportioning a certain amount of funding
toward good research to underpin
evaluations of programs . . . we don’t
always get good quality work so I think
that’s an issue that needs to be addressed
(S2)
There needs to be a much greater focus on
using the datasets that we have and
developing them in ways that don’t just
focus on data for administrative or
planning purposes but for examining
routine practice. I’m strong on the need for
information to drive changes and the need
for a systematic approach to look in to that
information (S6)
Sustainability, the most convincing argument
is always to first show that something can
reduce cost, perhaps reduce effort in terms
of time and that’s your very first thing . . . to
get into the door (S2)
There’s a big gulf between the
decision-making processes in health and
the evidence. I hope that the National
Health and Medical Research Council will
be doing something to address that . . . a
much bigger focus on policy and practice
focused research but I think that it’s not
just about providing evidence . . . there are
big cultural issues that should be the focus
of research (S5)
I actually think for things that are
dramatically wrong, reimbursement
structures are probably the way in which
you’re going to make the biggest
improvement happen, but there’s no good
track record in this country of that (S7)
The best way would be to get a few examples
of services which are clearly expensive,
either in themselves or because of the
volume . . . that could be brought to the
attention of ministers and senior
bureaucrats, with some notion of the
resources that would be freed up if those
procedures were at least limited or replaced.
There is plenty of that sort of stuff done
already. It’s just a case of pulling it together
in a way that they understand . . . academics
might have an interest in using their skills to
represent the data in different forms (S3)
It’s not a health piece of work, it’s a question
of psychology more than anything
else . . . no one’s done the work and applied
it in our sort of circumstance, whether it’s
in the very specific example like yours
[surgery for OSA] or more generally (S7)
I would have thought Australia and New
Zealand probably join up (S8)
Probably dollars and cents . . . articulate in a
way that policy makers will take notice of,
and you need an advocate, going up through
the normal channels with this will not work
(S5)
Research in this area is under resourced and
under utilized. There’s clearly a set of
barriers to people using evidence of a
whole range but one of the things,
obviously what you need is for the
research to be of the highest possible
quality and the greatest possible clarity.
And research on the research process itself
is needed to advance this. Then it becomes
harder for people to ignore it I suppose.
Which is why I think having some sort of
Australasian network would be a much
better way to go than a series of ad hoc
investigations (S8)
Note. The semistructured method allowed for expanded/detailed responses to the three questions relating to the future for disinvestment. The included select
quotes are chosen as offering representation of the theme/direction of consensus. No individual participant has more than one quote included in any one column
within the table (participant pseudonym(s) provided, eg, S1 = Stakeholder 1). The Medical Services Advisory Committee (MSAC) advises the Minister for
Health and Ageing on evidence for safety and (cost) -effectiveness of medical technologies and procedures. This advice informs decisions about public
funding.
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Another suggested the means of advancing a disinvest-
ment agenda was purported to lie in positioning within a
disinvestment drive a killer fact that will likely spawn politi-
cal action:
There are two things you should never see being made, sausages
and policy . . . a great deal of stuff goes in of dubious provenance
and what comes out the other end is anybody’s guess so, I mean
it’s a pretty tough game out there and you and I know how the
game’s played. The ‘killer fact’ is what one person introduced me
to . . . when you’re dealing with policy change, the creation of the
position of a killer fact is a great thing because it actually frightens
people into action . . . (Stakeholder #4).
The final predominant theme centered on calls by the policy
stakeholders for additional funding and collaborative support
to progress advances in Health Services Research and HTA
methodologies to underpin disinvestment processes (see right
column, Table 3). This is grounded in recognition by par-
ticipants that the HTA support structure required for disin-
vestment is complex. To underpin disinvestment, HTA must
address challenges specific to practices that are entrenched
within the medical and social system(s), including the bar-
riers to and carriers of evidence generation and uptake. One
participant offered the following:
. . . one of the really frustrating things is that we don’t seem to be
able to do the work that talks to us, that gets behind why people
do the things they do, and what needs to happen in order to ensure
more appropriate things happen . . . (Stakeholder #7)
Participants noted, for example, the necessary role that all
forms of evidence potentially must play in such analyses (in-
cluding gray literature) and the need for considered input
from multiple stakeholder perspectives to complement evi-
dence (eg, clinical, community, patient, and policy groups).
It was also recognized that in certain instances “industry”
perspectives offer heightened complexity associated with in-
centives and the potential for evidence manipulation:
It’s [PBAC] manipulated, let’s be clear about that, big, great com-
panies can hire these shiny health economists who could make
the sale of refrigerators in Alaska look positively cost-effective so
it’s not beyond manipulation but it’s certainly better than nothing
(Stakeholder #9)
DISCUSSION
In this study, we gauge the perspectives of a range of
senior Australian health policy stakeholders regarding the
challenges, current policy mechanisms and direction for
disinvestment from ineffective or inappropriately applied
healthcare practices. In Australia, the majority of health-
care services are either fully funded, or substantially subsi-
dized by Commonwealth and State governments with in-
vestment also from private health insurance bodies (18).
Hence, whenever questions of uncertainty of efficacy are
raised, health policy makers have not only a legitimate stake,
but a public expectation to be involved in the deliberations
and resolutions to ensure high-quality and appropriate health
care and efficient, justifiable resource allocation. Accom-
modating the split between Commonwealth/State and pri-
vate sector decision making is yet another challenge for
disinvestment.
Irrespective of the successes of the Australian policy
model in assessing new and emerging technologies, there
appears to exist either inadequate capacity or the lack of
political will to address both new and existing (potentially
obsolete) practices. As substantiated by participants in this
analysis, in Australia, old technologies or practices are rarely
formally de-commissioned on grounds of ineffectiveness (as
opposed to safety concerns) or as new items are approved.
Instead, the range of options (and, therefore, Medicare re-
imbursement items) grows ever larger. In this study, health
policy stakeholders identified three core themes associated
with the advancement of disinvestment in Australia, with pos-
sible lessons also for other jurisdictions. First, that a parallel
role for Australia’s assessment process for new medical tech-
nologies by means of MSAC may well be best-positioned to
facilitate a formal disinvestment agenda (or an entity based
on the MSAC model). However, this requires an increase
in dedicated resources to address existing technologies and
practices in parallel to new and emerging technologies. This
realization is not restricted to Australia. Recently, Wilen-
sky (29) intimated that similar limitations (and potential for
improvement) exist in the United States (USA), suggesting
investment is required to support prospective comparative
trials for new versus existing practices.
Second, participants considered that a substantial chal-
lenge exists in elevating the disinvestment agenda within
political circles. To do so requires an explicit focus on the
potential for cost-savings coupled with improved quality of
care. The challenge lies in maintaining a balance in per-
ceived controls on clinical autonomy and patient choice. It
is fundamental, therefore, that disinvestment is not perceived
a blunt, all-or-nothing instrument of rationing. Indeed re-
moving a reimbursement item number from the Schedule of
Medical Benefits (or the equivalent action in international
terms) might often be more than is required for successful
disinvestment. More commonly, a policy-guided process of
measured retraction may suffice. Such retraction may be per-
manent or temporary while evidence is generated to support
more conclusive decisions, as currently occurs with “interim
funding” conditions.
Third, policy stakeholders acknowledge that support
(financial and the collaborative involvement of all rele-
vant stakeholder groups) is needed for research advance-
ment in not only the generation of primary data (evidence)
that would make up the relevant HTA reports, but also
(of equal importance) the methodological underpinning of
HTA for disinvestment. Participants acknowledge that for
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existing items there are unique complexities that relate to the
technology or practice being entrenched within the “system”
and society more broadly. Some of these complexities in-
clude the following: resistance to change due to established
clinical training and practice paradigms; potentially com-
peting clinical, consumer, and political interests and values;
sensitivity in formulating or modifying incentive and dis-
incentive mechanisms; and the sunk costs of human and
physical capital that would, thereby, become obsolete. Re-
search and applied decision making in this area must, there-
fore, include both analysis of the “evidence” for safety, ef-
fectiveness, and cost-effectiveness as well as social, ethi-
cal, and political analyses if we are to explain why it is
that ineffective healthcare practices persist. Only then is
there scope to address how ineffective practices can be
disinvested.
As Draborg and Gyrd-Hansen (5), and Lehoux and
Williams-Jones (11;12) and others have articulated, HTA
groups together with health service and policy researchers
generally are well positioned to continue to lead and ad-
vance research in this area having broadened, “from primar-
ily addressing effectiveness and safety issues to covering
a broader array of issues such as psychological, organiza-
tional, ethical, and legal aspects” (5). Additional resources to
support HTA/disinvestment research would facilitate priority
driven, contextually relevant research to support decision-
making processes and to provide the answers that policy
advisors/makers need (for an interesting commentary see
Pirkis et al. [22], and an initiative by Borowski et al. [1]).
Moreover, it would contribute much-needed methodological
advances and align with the four main characteristics of ac-
tion research defined by Hart and Bond (9): (i) collaboration
between researchers and practitioners; (ii) solution of practi-
cal problems; (iii) change in practice; and (iv) development
of theory.
From an economic perspective, there remain method-
ological complexities in carrying out direct comparisons
between the incremental benefits to be gained from a new
technology or practice and the incremental benefits to be
foregone with those (potentially obsolete) practices or tech-
nologies to be disinvested. There are also complexities in how
this trade-off is communicated to policy makers in a form
that offers some decision-making utility. Program Budgeting
and Marginal Analysis offers potential in this area, given that
the approach aims to consider the opportunity costs within an
analysis (15;16). However, as Gafni and Birch (8) make clear,
“the opportunity cost of marginal healthcare resources is a
dynamic concept and its value will change as new programs
are funded and/or resource constraints change” (p. 2098).
To understand how a disinvestment framework might assist
policy makers in making difficult choices, it is, therefore,
important that the processes be justified and that the justi-
fication be transparent. As expressed by participants in this
study, to do this effectively requires (collaborative) research
to build these processes.
CONCLUSION
At present, Australia has limited systems in place to support
disinvestment from currently used ineffective, less-effective,
or inappropriately applied, healthcare practices. The poten-
tial overutilization of less than effective clinical practices and
the potential underutilization of effective clinical practices
not only results in less than optimal care but also fragmented,
inefficient, and (many would argue) unsustainable resource
allocation. Systematic policy approaches to disinvestment
may improve efficiency as well as equity, quality, and safety
of care, and perhaps even sustainability. Developing health
technology assessment and policy research methodologies
that tackle these complexities will advance the disinvestment
agenda. This is a burgeoning area of priority setting in health
care that requires national and international perspectives, de-
bate, and collaboration.
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